2004 05 07 Us And Them

© Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. All Rights ReservedMemo to: Oaktree Clients From: Howard Marks Re: Us and Them As a kid, I – and probably you – viewed the world in simple terms. There were good guys and bad guys. Americans and commies. Cops and r obbers. Settlers and redcoats. The Dodgers I cheered for and the Yankees who always won. Over time my view of the investment community has settled into an equally clear distinction: us and them. You’ve heard a lot from me about the differe nce between the “I know” school and the “I don’t know” school, concepts I introduced in “Wha t’s It All About, Alpha?” (July 2001) and elaborated on in “The Realist’s Creed” (May 2002) . In the last few years it has become clear to me that “we” don’t differ from “them” just in terms of how much we think we know about the future, but in many other ways as well. UDo You Know or Don’t You? Most of the investors I’ve met over the years have belonged to the “I know” school. This was particularly true in 1968-78, when I analy zed equities, and even in 1978-95, when I had switched to non-mainstream invest ments but still worked at equity-centric money management firms. It’s easy to identify member s of the “I know” school:  They think knowledge of the future directi on of economies, interest rates, markets and widely followed mainstream stocks is essential for investment success.  They’re confident it can be achieved.  They know they can do it.  They’re aware that lots of other people are trying to do it too, but they figure either (a) everyone can be successful at the same time, or (b) only a few can be, but they’re among them.  They’re comfortable investing based on their opinions regarding the future.  They’re also glad to share th eir views with others, even t hough correct forecasts should be of such great value that no one would give them away gratis.  They rarely look back to rigorously assess their record as forecasters. “Confident” is the key word for describing members of this school. For the “I don’t know” school, on the other hand, the word – especially when dealing with th e macro-future – is “guarded.” Its adherents generally believe you can’t know the future; you don’t have to know the future; and the proper goal is to do the best possible job of investing in the absence of that knowledge. © Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. All Rights Reserved 2 UThe Benefits of Membership As a member of the “I know” school, you get to opine on the future (and maybe have people take notes). You may be sought out for your opi nions and considered a de sirable dinner guest . . . especially when the stock market’s going up. Join the “I don’t know” school a nd the results are more mixed. You’ll soon tire of saying “I don’t know” to friends and strangers alike. After a while, even relatives will stop asking where you think the market’s going. You’ll never ge t to enjoy that 1-in -1,000 moment when your forecast comes true and the Wall Street Journal runs your picture. On the other hand, you’ll be spared all those times when forecasts miss the ma rk, as well as the losses that can result from investing based on over-rated knowledge of the future. But how do you think it feels to have prospective clients ask about your investment outlook and have to say, “I have no idea”? For me, the bottom line on which school is best comes from the late Stanford behaviorist, Amos Tversky: “It’s frightening to think that you might not know something, but more frightening to think that, by and large, the world is run by people who have faith that they know exactly what’s going on.” 0BU“A group of related or coincident things, events, actions, etc.” Random House’s secondary definition for the wo rd “syndrome,” shown above, suggests a set of elements that can be viewed separately but take on greater meaning when considered together. And the more I think about it, the more I see su ch a pattern in the contrasting styles of investment industry participants. Investors don’t just differ in regard to thei r views on foreknowledge, but in terms of a large number of elements. And the pattern among those elements seems to be consistent – correlated – not random. Ask yourself, for example, whethe r the “I don’t know” sch ool is evenly divided between bulls and bears. Maybe, but in my experience, members of the “I don’t know” school tend to trust less in the market than those of the “I know” school. That’s an example of the pattern, or syndrome, that I think investors tend to demonstrate in many regards. In my memo “Returns and How They Get That Way” (November 2002), I gave examples from a brilliant dichotomization propounded by Ni cholas Taleeb. His book, “Fooled By Randomness,” has as its theme the pervasive role of luck in investi ng and the tendency of people to overlook its effect. He provides a ta ble that shows a number of things in the first column that can easily be mistaken for things in the second column. Luck Skill Randomness Determinism Probability Certainty Belief, conjecture Knowledge, certitude Theory Reality Anecdote, coincidence Causality, law Survivorship bias Market outperformance Lucky idiot Skilled investor © Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. All Rights Reserved 3 My point here, and my reason for reproducing part of Taleeb’s table, is my belief that there are people who see the things on the left, and there are people who see the things on the right, but few who see some of each. Some people think their ability to infer causality and analyze data makes them skilled investors capable of producing consistent outperformance. Others understand that luck plays a big part; that a lot of apparent causality is really coincidence; and that the person crowned the most skilled investor in a given year might be nothing more than a “lucky idiot.” Very few people mix aspects from both columns. I can think of many qualities th at seem to go together to define one of the two main types of investor but not the other. I’ll discuss them below and at tribute them to either the “Oaktree-style” investors with whom I tend to asso ciate – “us” – or the other sort of investor – “them.” 1BUPersonality Type It would be great to either be middle-of-the-road and dispassionate all the time or, better yet, bullish or bearish at just the right time. But few people can achieve either of those ideals. Most investors are congenitally either bullish or b earish, and I’ve never s een anyone capable of flipping in an adroit and timely manner from one to the other. For most of us, it’s either bullish most of the time or bearish most of the time – right or wrong. For many of the outstanding investors I’ve come across, it’s the latter. And I shouldn’t say bearish – I’ve just used that word as shortha nd for a number of others. But the “us-style” investor tends to be cautious and defensive, while the “they-style” i nvestor tends to be optimistic, confident and aggressive. And the investors I like most are patient. B ecause they know they can’t be right every time, their real concern is with the long run. On the other hand, the “I know” investor feels he has a good handle on what lies ahead and thus plans to do an above-average job every year – an admirable goal, perhaps, but I don’t think highly achievable. 2BUHunt for Upside or Avoid Downside? One of the most significant ways in which these di fferences manifest themselves is in terms of attitude toward risk. If you’re confident th at you know what the future holds, risk isn’t frightening. But if you’re convi nced that you don’t have that good a handle on the future, it’s hard to be very cocky. Our kind of investor is preoccupi ed by risk, whereas I think the ot her is often oblivious to it. Our kind worries about what can go wrong, while the other revels in what might go right. Ours tries to avoid mistakes, and the other concentrates on finding winners. Ours obsesses about the losers he might buy or hold, while the ot her dwells on the opportunities he might miss. In short, it’s offense versus defense. © Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. All Rights Reserved 4 3BUOther Aspects of Investment Style The optimist tends more often than not to be a growth investor; he’s confident that above-average growth can be perpetuated and that he can identify the companies that’ll do so. The more cautious investor looks for value – for tangib le attributes that can be counted on for price support even if confidence in the company proves to be unwarranted. Our school of investing puts gr eat emphasis on being a contrari an. If you want to buy something of solid value, and you want to buy it for less than it’s worth, you’ll have a better chance if you look among assets, companies and markets that are out of favor. Thus we’re happiest when we’re not part of the herd; we prefer to watch the herd’s extreme boom-bust behavior and profit from its mistakes. Most othe r investors seem to be happy when they’re part of the herd and following the trend. Our kind of investor likes to average down. He holds a firm view of his securities’ value and wants to increase his holdings at lower prices. T hus he likes to see pric es decline (although he’s not cocky enough to completely dismiss the possibility that the mark et’s right rather than him). The trend follower wants to see appreciation and is disheartened by initial declines. In fact, I think he prefers to average up as a ppreciation validates his thesis. Certain that his forecasts are right and his portfolio is properly positioned, the “I know” investor wants to let his profits ride. The “I don’t know” investor is pa infully aware of how much he doesn’t know; how much of his performance is beyond his control; that good fortune may have contributed to his results to date ; and that events can easily turn against him. Thus he’s happy taking profits and banking some of his gains. If appreciation occurs beyo nd his expectations, it makes him stop and think . . . and maybe sell, not just celebrate. The “we” investor is comfortable holding cash when he can’t find attractive investments. At the present time, a number of the investors I most respect are holding or returning significant amounts of cash, or closing their funds. The confid ent “them” investor is pained by cash – he thinks he always should be ab le to find something worth buying. And he tends to be more relative-return oriented, and thus worried that an index or competitor might beat him if he isn’t fully invested. I see an extreme dichotomy in the fact that th e “us” investor worries about losing money, while the other worries about underperforming. (I can’t claim to be 100% the former, because I – and most of Oaktree’s clients – thi nk that in the long run, the best manager is the one who beats the others. That’s something that’s hard to argue with. But my desire for relative performance doesn’t make me comfortable with losses.) Lastly, because the “I don’t know” investor is highly conscious of his limitations, he is likely to aggressively limit his assets under management. Most of the “I know” investors, who tend to work in the more liquid mainstream markets, ne ver met a dollar of AUM they didn’t like – or didn’t feel they could ac hieve great things with. © Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. All Rights Reserved 5 UAttitudes Toward the Market The actions of “they” investor s are often driven by their vi ews regarding the outlook for the market. They invest more aggressively when the outlook’s positive than they do when it’s negative (although, as I said before, they’re usuall y positive). “We” inve stors tend to invest from the bottom up, primarily basing investment decisions on whether attractive individual investment opportunities are available. In fact, I’m often struck by the fact that “the y” are preoccupied with studying and assessing the behavior of “the market” – which collectively means study ing themselves. My favorite investors – both inside and outside Oaktree – spend their time almost exclusively looking into individual companies and their securities. One of the greatest dichotomies is that “they” impute intelligence to the market while “we” are highly skeptical of it. Trillions of dollars were lost after 1998-99 because the mass of investors hadn’t sufficiently questioned the valuations of te ch stocks. They’d been told, “The market’s efficient” and assumed that if a stock was selling at a price, that meant the price was justified. The investors I respect feel the market’s of ten wrong – either underpricing or overpricing securities – and more than anything else, they look for opportunities to profit from those errors. In their view, as Dickens said about the law, “the market’s an ass.” 4BUSo Where Do We Stand Today? The market is a big arena where optimists and pessimists engage in a tug of war. When optimism is rising relative to pessimism, meani ng more money wants to get put to work than wants to exit, prices rise (and vice versa). The market has been going roughly sideways for the last few months, meaning the two camps are in rough balance. But that doesn’t mean they’re not both out there. Everyone had a great year in 2003, and “they” seem to think it’s going to continue. They’re cheered by signs of economic recovery, corporat e profit gains and job growth. “We,” on the other hand, worry about the things that could result in disappointment, like the lackluster economic and employment gains, and the trad e and budget deficits. We also worry about structural issues, such as the US’s reliance on foreign capital, the questionable outlook for the dollar, and the consumer’s high level of indebted ness and low level of savings. Lastly, we feel the possibility of domestic terrorism hangs out there like a sword of Damocles. A particularly striking difference can be s een in current attitudes toward interest rates. Rates do a great deal to influence the vitality of the economy and the price and relative attractiveness of market sectors. Today’s lo w rates encourage growth and borrowing. They also reduce the competition to stocks posed by bonds and money market securities. Finally, since interest rates are used in present value calculations to discount future cash flows, lower interest rates result in higher valuations for all assets. Obviously, then, today’s record low rates go a long way to expl aining what’s going on in the investment world. With money market securi ties yielding 1% and Trea sury notes at 3-4%, yields of 6-8% on high yield bonds look attractive; market-neu tral hedge funds look like a bonanza at 9-11%; and expectati ons of 15-20% are enough to attr act money to private equity © Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. All Rights Reserved 6 (rather than the old 25-3 0%). Just as importantly, low interest rates lower the hurdle return for equities and justify p/e ratios in the high 20s. What sums it up is the line that “stock s aren’t overpriced give n the current level of interest rates.” “They” derive comfort from the fact th at today’s valuations are consistent with today’s rates, while “we” worry about the impact on valuations that a rise in rates would have. Rates can’t go down all that much, but th ere’s plenty of room for them to go up . (I still have the framed notice from 1980 telling me that the rate on my bank loan had reached 22¼%!) That tells me that p/e ratios can’t rationally go up much more but there’s plenty of room for them to go down. And if we ignore the threat of a ra te rise and merely assume that rates will hold steady, the resulting return on the averag e stock would be just in line with normal profits growth in mid-single digits. So the optimist is cheered by the low rates (and their stimulative power), and the pessimist is concerned about the risk imp licit in a possible rate rise. Or, as it seems to me, “we” worry about valuations and “they” feel comfortab le on the subject . . . as usual. 5BUHow About an Example Rather than hold up my Oaktree colleagues as exem plars of astute “us-style” investors (which I think they are), I’d like to propos e an unnamed investor for your c onsideration. I’ll tick off his credentials for inclusion (as I see them) and thro w in a few quotes from his recent writings.  He never bases his investment actions on forecas ts for the economy or market. “. . . the cemetery for seers has a huge section set aside for macro forecasters. We have in fact made few macro forecasts . . , and we have seldom seen others make them with sustained success.”  Rather, his actions are strictly determined by the availability of attractive investment opportunities. “Under any market or economic conditions, we will be happy to buy businesses that meet our standards.”  He’s a solid investor in valu e – be it derived from current cash flow, unique market position or special human resources.  Because of his risk awareness and desire to avoid losers, he always insists on a generous “margin of safety.”  He is absolutely unconcerned if an index or competitor outperforms him for a year or two, but he insists on avoiding losses. Losing less than his competitor s is not his definition of success.  When attractive investment opportun ities are few, he’s willing to stand at the plate with the bat on his shoulder – something he says he’s do ing a lot of nowadays. In 2003, that caused his holdings of cash to triple. “Our capital is underutilized no w . . . . It’s a painful condition to be in – but not as painful as doing something stupid.” © Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. All Rights Reserved 7  He seems happiest when betting against the herd . For example, on the subject of distressed bonds, he says “yesterday’s weeds” (which yielded 30-50% in 2002), are being priced as “today’s flowers” (and thus yiel ding 4-6%). He’s written me that he “liked them better when they were weeds.”  Certainly he’s a patient long- term investor (and, in fact, Unot U much of a profit taker; he recently expressed some regret about ha ving not sold during The Great Bubble).  He is very conscious of the effect of increas ed capital on investment returns. “When [a manager] tells you that increased funds won’t hurt his investment performance, step back: His nose is about to grow.” There are lots of ways to skin the cat, and certainly there are successful investors among “them.” But the characteristics enumerated above have provided the foundation for Warren Buffett’s incredible record, and th at makes them good enough for me. * * * To help you see the picture I’m suggesting and evaluate the investors you come across, I’ve prepared the quick-and-dirty checklist that a ppears on the following page. Few people will hit every point on the head, but I thi nk you’ll recognize in the list on the left a lot of the “they” school investors you know, and on the right, hopefully, a few from the “us” school. Each year – especially in good times – the headlines will go to those on the left who guess correctly. But in the long run I think it’s people on the right who’ll be celebrated most. In today’s trend toward hedge funds, I see a growing preference – whether conscious or unconscious – for “us” investors over “them .” Consistent, risk-c onscious, non-market- based investing is enjoying great popularity right now. I’ve considered it the ticket for almost three decades. And by the way, I have one last thing to say: Uvive la difference!! U In order for us to be contrarians, there has to be someone to be c ontrary to. If everyone invested our way, the opportunities we prize would be few and far between. The best opportunities for investment returns aren’t created by companies, exchanges or paper securities; they result from the mistakes other investors make . It’s Oaktree’s job to take advantage of them. May 7, 2004 P.s.: As I wrote this memo, one thing pained me, and I want to address it: I found myself constantly writing “he,” even though I absolutely do not think investing skill is gender-related. It’s just that I hate the thought of using “he/she” each time. (My son Andrew’s school uses s/he.) And I find ungrammatical today’s popular , gender-neutral formulation that “the top- performing investor finds that their gains come from hard work” – a plural pronoun substituting for a singular noun. So please bear with me; I’m really an equal opportunity memo writer. © Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. All Rights Reserved 8 UTHEM U UUS U “I know” “I don’t know” Bullish by nature Bearish by nature A g g r e s s i v e D e f e n s i v e Confident Guarded Comfortable with risk Obsessed with risk What might go right? What might go wrong? Worried about winners missed Worried about losers bought Trend followers Contrarians Attracted to pretty flowers Glad to search among the weeds Comfortable when part of the crowd Happy when apart from the crowd Growth/momentum investors Value investors “Great things cost a lot” Insistent on buying cheap B e l i e v e r s S k e p t i c s “We’re in a new era” “Tr ees don’t grow to the sky” Cheered by appreciation Fri ghtened by excessive appreciation Enjoy averaging up Enjoy averaging down “Let it ride” Eager to take profits Relative return-oriented Absolute return-oriented Worried about underperforming Worried about losing money Pained by cash Comfortable with cash Confident in their powers Aware that much is beyond their control Convinced that their good returns Highly conscious of the role are fully deserved played by luck I m p a t i e n t P a t i e n t Short term-fixated Long term-oriented Never worried by large amounts Aware that it’s possible to have of capital too much capital Engrossed in watching the market Devoted to watching companies “The market’s efficient” “The market’s an ass” UEverything’s okay: U UWorries abound: U Economic recovery underway Movement of jobs overseas Corporate profit gains Gaping trade deficit Increases in productivity Growing budget deficit Continuing foreign investment Reliance on foreign capital Ability of weak dollar to bolster exports Threat to value of the dollar Existence of job growth Halting nature of job growth Optimism implied by willingness to borrow Consumers’ high debt/low savings Strong military capability Risk of terrorism Low level of interest rates Risk of interest rate rise Today’s security prices are justified Today’s security prices are reliant by low rates on rates staying low © Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. All Rights Reserved 9 Legal Information and Disclosures This memorandum expresses the views of the author as of the date indicated and such views are subject to change without notice. Oaktree has no duty or ob ligation to update the information contained herein. Further, Oaktree makes no representation, and it should not be assumed, that past investment performance is an indication of future results. More over, wherever there is th e potential for profit there is also the possibility of loss. This memorandum is being made av ailable for educational purposes only and should not be used for any other purpose. The information contained herein do es not constitute and should not be construed as an offering of advisory services or an offer to sell or solicitation to buy any securities or related financial instruments in any jurisdiction. Certain inform ation contained herein concerning economic trends and performance is based on or derived from informatio n provided by independent third-party sources. Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. (“Oaktree”) believes that the sources from which such information has been obtained are reliable; however, it cannot g uarantee the accuracy of su ch information and has not independently verified the accuracy or complete ness of such information or the assumptions on which such information is based. This memorandum, including the information cont ained herein, may not be copied, reproduced, republished, or posted in whole or in part, in an y form without the prior written consent of Oaktree.